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ABSTRACT
A classical question of political science is to what extent electoral systems
influence voting behaviour. Yet, many of these studies examine how different
electoral systems affect the election results in terms of vote distribution across
parties. Instead, we investigate how electoral rules affect intra party
preference voting. Given the importance of the debate on the personalization
of politics, insight into how electoral rules shape intra-party choice is a
valuable contribution to the literature. In our study, we focus on the effect of
two specific rules: the option to cast a list vote and on a single versus
multiple preference votes. The results of experiments conducted in Belgium
and the Netherlands show that electoral rules indeed influence voting
behaviour with regard to intra party preference voting, although differences
exist between the Netherlands and Belgium. Moreover, we find that the
option to cast a list vote equally affects votes for the first candidate on the
list, as well as lower positioned candidates. This suggests that preference
votes might be less preferential than has often been assumed.
Introduction
Starting with Duverger (1951), the question how electoral rules influence elec-
toral behaviour has been of central interest to political scientists (Blais and
Carty 1991; Clark and Golder 2006; Cox 1997; Singer and Stephenson 2009).
However, whereas most of these studies examine how different electoral
systems influence election results in terms of vote distribution across
parties, in this paper, we investigate how electoral rules influence voting for
candidates within a party. Intra-party preference votes are an important
feature in a number of European countries such as Belgium, Denmark,
Latvia, The Netherlands, Slovenia, Switzerland, and Sweden (Katz 2003). For
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candidates, preference votes are important because they matter in determin-
ing which candidates take up the seats won by the party, influencing the com-
position of parliament. Furthermore, they reflect a candidate’s popularity and
may influence a candidate’s ballot list position at the next election or help can-
didates to obtain more internal power within the party (André et al. 2015;
Wauters, Verlet, and Ackaert 2012). The idea of intra-party preference voting
also fits within the broader personalization thesis (McAllister 2007; Rahat
and Sheafer 2007), which states that individual political actors are becoming
more important at the expense of collective political actors. According to Kar-
vonen (2010, 63) “in those countries where the possibility of choosing
between individual candidates has existed for a long time, the relative impor-
tance of individual candidates seems to have increased”. For example, until
the 1980s, in the Netherlands, the percentage of preference votes often
stayed under 10%, whereas during the last elections, this has fluctuated
around 20%, with a peak in 2002 of 27% (Van Holsteyn and Andeweg
2012). A similar trend can be found in Belgium, where compared to previous
decades, much more voters cast a preference vote, peaking in 2003, when
almost 70% of the voters casted a preference vote (André, Wauters, and
Pilet 2012). At the same time, Karvonen (2010) did not find conclusive evi-
dence for a trend towards more candidate-centred electoral systems.
However, in an extensive study on electoral reforms, Renwick and Pilet
(2016) came to a different conclusion. They do observe a trend towards
more candidate-centred electoral systems, probably because they used a
“more fine-grained classification of the intra-party dimension” (Renwick and
Pilet 2016, 267). Examples are Bulgaria, where a closed list system was
replaced by an open list system with preference voting in 2011 and
Belgium, where rules were introduced in 2002, which increased the weight
given to preference votes. Thus, intra-party preference voting is increasingly
becoming important in many European countries and therefore, to fully
understand voting behaviour, we also have to understand intra-party prefer-
ence voting.
Previous research has examined which voters are more likely to cast prefer-
ence votes and found that especially political interest is an important predic-
tor (André, Wauters, and Pilet 2012; Marsh 1985; Van Holsteyn and Andeweg
2012). However, these studies focus mostly on individual characteristics of citi-
zens to explain preference voting. Other studies look more specifically at insti-
tutions, classifying different electoral formulas and explaining how they might
affect the vote-seeking behaviour of candidates (Carey and Shugart 1995). Yet,
they do not examine how these institutions affect voters. With this paper, we
aim to fill this gap. We test the influence not of an electoral system as such, but
of variations of the same electoral system: flexible list systems (Carey and
Shugart 1995). Flexible list proportional representation systems are amongst
the most commonly used electoral systems in Europe. Yet, the system (and
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its effects) is understudied (André et al. 2015). In flexible list systems, both pre-
ference votes and the rank ordering of candidates by the party determine
which candidates are elected. Therefore, the system should be distinguished
from closed lists (where only the party rank ordering determines which can-
didates are elected) and open lists (where only preference votes determine
the elected candidates) (Shugart 2005).
There is considerable variation between the different countries where flex-
ible list systems are used with regard to how open or restrictive the system is.
Probably, the most important distinction is whether casting a preference vote
is optional or not. In some countries, such as Austria, Belgium, Luxemburg, and
Sweden, voters can choose whether they vote for a candidate or cast a so-
called list vote, a vote for the party list as a whole. In other countries, such
as Finland and the Netherlands, voters cannot cast a list vote and preference
voting is obligatory. Shugart (2005, 43) calls this subtype of the flexible list
system a latent list. A second difference relates to the number of preference
votes voters may cast (Karvonen 2011).1 In some countries, voters may cast
multiple preference votes. In other countries, voters are restricted to a
single candidate. In this study, we focus on these two differences and there-
fore contribute to the understanding and effects of variations of preferential
list systems of which “little is currently known” (Shugart 2005, 43).
Most studies on the effects of electoral systems answer their question by
comparing election results between different systems with different electoral
rules. Problematic with this approach, however, is that many factors might be
involved which were not taken into account in the analysis. In response to this
problem, a recent strand of literature has emerged which conducts exper-
iments in order to study how voters react to changes in the electoral
system (Blais et al. 2012; Blumenau et al. 2014; Laslier et al. 2015; Van der
Straeten, Laslier, and Blais 2013). With this study, we follow this literature,
and conduct an experiment to investigate the role of electoral rules on
voting behaviour. An extra feature of our experiment is that it is executed
in two countries: Belgium and the Netherlands. These two countries are the
opposite of each other on the two rules we are interested in. The electoral
system of Belgium allows voters to cast either a list vote or one or multiple
preference votes. Belgian voters who support the party and have no prefer-
ence for individual candidates (or agree with the party on the order of candi-
dates) have the option to cast a list vote. Voters who have a preference for
individual candidate(s) can cast multiple preference votes as long as these
candidates belong to the same party (De Winter 2005). Dutch voters, on the
other hand, are forced to vote for a single candidate (Andeweg 2005). There-
fore, we should notice that in our experiment, the Dutch perspective is more
interesting. Dutch voters – compared to Belgian voters – are more restricted in
showing their actual preference. The experiment allows us to investigate what
happens when these constrains are lifted. An extra benefit is that this gives us
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an indication of how preferential a preference vote is. Studies have often
argued that due to the nature of the Dutch system, where voters are forced
to cast a single preference vote, the vote for the list puller does not really
reflect the preference for a candidate, but simply a choice for the party.
With a survey, Van Holsteyn and Andeweg (2010) show that approximately
only 30% of the voters who casted a vote for the list puller actually stated
to have a preference for that candidate. Therefore, in general, only votes for
candidates from the second position onwards are considered to be actual pre-
ference votes in the Netherlands (Andeweg 2005). With the use of our exper-
iment, we can examine to what extent this is indeed the case by investigating
how the introduction of a list vote affects the votes for list pullers and for other
candidates. A second question our experiments enable us to answer is how
voters with multiple preferences deal with the fact that they can only cast a
single preference vote.
The benefit from conducting our experiment in two countries is that it
enables us to test our expectations in two different contexts. Of course, we
should stress that we still have to be careful when comparing the results of
the experiments in both countries (we discuss this in more detail below).
Our analysis will therefore focus on discussing the effects within a country
first. However, conducting the results in two contexts and comparing their
results allow bringing into account one limitation of the experimental
design, namely that electoral system effects become real via a learning
process. Thus, when introduced to new rules, in the beginning, respondents
may still stick to their usual voting habits and behaviour, and only over
time adopt the new rules. This may lead us to underestimate the effects of
our treatments. Comparing the results between two countries, which cur-
rently stand opposite to each other on the rules we test, provides us an (ten-
tative) insight into the extent of this underestimation.
Electoral rules and the influence on preference voting
Using an experiment to investigate the effects of electoral rules on the elec-
tion outcome is in line with a recent trend. Blumenau et al. (2014), for
example, study the effect of open versus closed list electoral systems on
party choice. They demonstrate that voters under an open list system are
likely to switch from niche parties to mainstream parties. In the study of Blu-
menau et al., this meant that some Eurosceptic voters voted for UKIP under
the closed list rules and switch their vote to a Eurosceptic candidate of the
conservative party under the open list rules. Other experiments were con-
ducted as part of the “making electoral democracy work” project (Blais
2010). These experiments were conducted as quasi-experiments around real
elections, inviting people to vote under different electoral systems. The
general conclusion of these experiments is that a substantial number of
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voters vote differently in different systems, showing that voters are responsive
to changes in electoral rules (Blais et al. 2012; Laslier et al. 2015; Van der Strae-
ten, Laslier, and Blais 2013). We expect similar results with regard to prefer-
ence voting. Especially for the Dutch case, where some respondents get
“new” opportunities to express their vote, we expect that when these new
rules become available, some Dutch voters will actively use the option to
cast a list vote and others choose to cast multiple preference votes.
We are also interested in how rules shape the electoral outcome. As dis-
cussed earlier, usually in the Netherlands, only votes for candidates on the
second place on the list or lower are regarded as actual preference votes,
because the choice for the first candidate is often a choice for the party
(Andeweg 2005, 494)2. Therefore, it seems reasonable to expect that a sub-
stantial number of these voters would have casted a list vote if that option
had been available to them. It is less likely that voters who voted for other can-
didates (i.e. candidates from the second position on the candidate list
onwards) switch to a list vote. In general, these votes are considered as an
expression of a real preference and, moreover, they are a more sophisticated
type of voting behaviour (Marsh 1985), as casting a vote for a specific candi-
date who is not the list puller requires additional information about the can-
didates. The general assumption is that these voters made a conscious choice
for a specific candidate within a party, so there is no reason to expect that a
substantial number of them would switch to casting a list vote if that option
were available. The consequence of this is that we can expect that in a situ-
ation where Dutch voters have the option to cast a list vote, this would
reduce the votes cast for the list puller, but not so much for other candidates.
The latter is seen as an actual preference vote, whereas the former is often a
reflection of support for the party. These expectations are from a “Dutch” per-
spective, that is, from the perspective that the list vote becomes available.
So, would we expect different outcomes if the perspective is the other way
around: if the option to cast a list vote disappears, that is, from the Belgian
perspective? Voters who normally cast a list vote – accepting the order of
the list – need to change their behaviour if the option to cast a list vote dis-
appears. We expect that especially the list puller will profit from this. André
et al. show that voters with less political interest and sophistication are
more likely to cast list votes, because party labels “act as brand names from
which rationally ignorant and risk-averse voters can readily infer information
about the issue positions and policy commitment of all candidates a party
endorsed” (André, Wauters, and Pilet 2012, 296). When these less sophisti-
cated voters can no longer use the easy option of a list vote, they have to
find an alternative (easy) solution. We expect that the most likely heuristic
for these voters would be to rely on the ballot list position: they will cast a
vote for the list puller, instead of a vote for another candidate. This bias
towards the first option on a list can be interpreted as a primacy effect (see
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Brockington 2003; Miller and Krosnick 1998). Consequently, we expect that
once voters can no longer cast a list vote, it is especially the list puller profiting
from this, although in that case this vote does not reflect a real preference for
the list puller but simply a preference for the party. To summarize, we expect
that:
(1) Voters who do not have the option to cast a list vote are more likely to
vote for the list puller than voters who do have the option to cast a list
vote.
(2) Voters who do not have the option to cast a list vote and voters who do
have the option to cast a list vote will behave similarly when it comes to
casting votes for other candidates.
Another major difference between the Belgian and Dutch system is the
number of preference votes citizens can cast. We expect that the lower the
candidates are placed on the list, the more they benefit if voters have the
option to cast multiple preference votes. List pullers will hardly be affected
by the number of preference votes that may be cast. In Belgium, many
voters combine a vote for the list puller with a vote for another candidate,
often a more local candidate (Wauters, Weekers, and Pilet 2004). If these
voters were forced to vote for only one candidate, we expect that more
voters would drop the vote for the other candidate(s). First of all, previous
studies have shown that candidates at the top of the list receive more prefer-
ence votes (Marcinkiewicz 2014; Miller and Krosnick 1998). Since this proven
tendency to vote for higher placed candidates, we expect that it is more likely
that voters drop the preference for a lower placed candidate when they are
forced to vote for only one candidate. Second, a bandwagon effect could
occur if citizens vote for the candidate who is expected to receive more
votes. This could be because they think that their vote gets wasted if they
vote for a lower placed candidate, who is not likely to get enough votes in
order to get elected. When voters get the opportunity to cast more preference
votes, this will benefit lower ranked candidates, because voters who normally
only vote for the list puller might decide to also cast a vote for another can-
didate who they wish to give additional support. The question is whether we
should expect something different for the group of voters who also have the
option the cast a list vote and the group of voters who do not have this option.
Other than that, the option to cast a list vote will lead to a lower number of
preference votes; we do not expect that the pattern will be different. These
expectations can be summarized as:
(1) Voters who can cast multiple preference votes are more likely to vote for
lower positioned candidates than voters who can only cast a single pre-
ference vote.
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(2) Voters who can cast multiple preference votes and voters who can only
cast a single preference vote will be equally likely to vote for higher posi-
tioned candidates.
Research design
We conducted an experiment simultaneously in Belgium (Flanders) and the
Netherlands using a between-group design. The advantage of an experiment
similarly in two countries is that if we find similar results, this strengthens our
conclusions, whereas different trends show that the effect institutions exert
on voting behaviour is influenced by the specific context. Since we test the
effect of two institutional rules (stimuli), we need four groups in each
country to which respondents are randomly assigned (see Table 1). Respon-
dents in group 1 have the option to either cast a list vote or to cast a prefer-
ence vote for one candidate. Group 2 reflects the Belgian system: respondents
can cast a list vote or cast a preference vote for one or multiple candidates, as
long as these candidates belong to the same party. Respondents in group 3
can vote according to Dutch rules: they are forced to cast a vote for a
single candidate. Finally, respondents in group 4 do not have the option to
cast a list vote, but can cast multiple preference votes.
As part of the data collection, we created two almost identical surveys to
conduct our experiment, one for Dutch and one for Belgian respondents.
Both surveys were distributed by Survey Sampling International (SSI). This
guaranteed that respondents in both countries received an identical survey
with regard to layout and so on. SSI has its own panels from which respon-
dents were drawn. These panels consist of people who registered them-
selves.3 We aimed to have 750 respondents for each country. Since we
conduct an experiment, the prerequisite of having a representative sample
is less important than in a normal survey, as long as respondents are randomly
assigned to a treatment group. Nevertheless, in order to increase our external
validity, we tried to aim for representative samples. Therefore, representative
quotas on key socio-demographic characteristics (gender, age, region, and
education) were used. These quotas were applied to each characteristic indi-
vidually, and not combined. For this research especially, the quota on edu-
cation level is important if we want to increase our external validity, as
previous studies show that political interest and knowledge are important
Table 1. Experimental groups.
Number of preference votes
One Multiple
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predictors of casting a preference votes (André, Wauters, and Pilet 2012).
Although the relation is not one on one, education is strongly related to
political knowledge (e.g. Rasmussen 2015) and therefore forms a good
proxy for it.
The survey had four parts. In the first part, respondents were asked for
which party they would vote if national elections were held that day. This
question served as a filter to decide whether respondents would participate
in the experiment or not: only respondents who said that they would vote
(for a party) were included. We also excluded respondent for the smallest
parties (see online Appendix A), because it would have been too difficult to
design a candidate list for these parties with enough candidates that could
be recognized by the voters. Eventually, we had 785 respondents in the Neth-
erlands and 788 in Belgium who passed the filter questions and participated
(see online Appendix E). Second, respondents received an explanation of the
electoral rules under which they could vote, based on the group to which they
were randomly assigned4 (see online Appendix B). After respondents had read
these instructions, they preceded to the third part of the survey: a ballot
paper. The ballot paper they received depended on the group they were
assigned to and their party choice (see online Appendix C for examples).
Finally, the fourth section contained some more general questions, such as
a question on how sympathetic respondents find the list puller of their party.
Each ballot paper included 20 candidates of the chosen party and, for the
relevant experimental groups, also allowed voters to cast a list vote. We
designed candidate lists with real politicians, instead of fictional candidates.5
Although fictional candidates have the advantage that the researcher exerts
more control over the experiment, it would nevertheless be problematic for
the design of this study. Fictional candidates are not known by respondents
and therefore are more likely to drive respondents in the direction of
casting a list vote or a vote for the first candidate, since they are unlikely to
have preferences for candidates they do not know. Hence, we opted for
real candidates, to make sure that, next to the party leader, each ballot
paper has a number of candidates that are also known by respondents.
Thus, we also put ministers and members of parliament on the lists. Of
course, there may still be respondents left who only know the party leader,
but this is in line with reality.
To increase comparability not only between Belgium and the Netherlands,
but also between political parties within each country, we first designed a
general concept list that could be applied to each party using criteria that
were held constant across political parties and the two countries. Therefore,
differences between political parties with regard to the electoral strength of
the ballot list would not be too large. For example, we made sure that for
all parties, the sixth place was occupied by an incumbent parliamentarian.
To design this concept list, we used standardized mixture of a few
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characteristics to guide us: incumbency, gender, ethnicity, and regionalism.
Not only are these characteristics taken into account by real-life selectors
(Put and Maddens 2013; Gallagher 1988), they are also predictors for the
success of a candidate in terms of preference votes (e.g. Maddens et al.
2007; Van Holsteyn and Andeweg 2012). Subsequently, using this general
concept list, we created candidate lists for each party with actual politicians
from that party. We designed two concept lists: one for the larger (govern-
ment) parties and another for the smaller parties. This made it possible to
put more familiar candidates on the list of the larger parties. If we had
made a draft list which should apply to all parties, we would have been
restricted in, for example, the number of members of parliament we could
include on the list since some smaller parties only have a few members of
parliament.
The list we created is different from what Belgian voters are used to,
because respondents normally vote in a district where each party presents
a district-specific list. However, we kept the lists the same so all Belgian
respondents, irrespective of their district, got the same ballot with candidates
from all districts. This was done to guarantee comparability of the experiments
since we wanted to avoid that the presented lists in the Netherlands were
“stronger” than in Belgium. The draft lists and identification of parties as
large/small are given in online Appendix D.
The way we set up the experiment has a potential problem. We gave voters
only limited information on how their votes influence the (hypothetical) seat
distribution, while we know from the literature on strategic voting that this
could influence the decision voters take (e.g. Blais et al. 2012). The choice,
to give respondents no detailed information on what the rules meant and
what their (potential) purpose is, was deliberate. We did not want to prime
voters in a certain direction and thereby artificially increase the use of specific
options. After all, in a real ballot box, voters also only receive a ballot paper.
Consequently, it is possible that voters turned to the knowledge of their
own electoral system. Dutch voters and Belgian voters thus could have some-
thing different in mind while participating in our experiment. This is especially
true for the introduction of the list-vote in the Netherlands, since we only told
participants that with a list-vote they “support the candidate list as a whole”.
This complicates the results of our experiment. However, we do not think it is
too problematic. In our analysis, the main focus will be on the results of both
countries individually. In that part of the analysis, this is no problem, because
we can assume that since voters are used to the same rules in real life, there is
no difference between the experimental groups in their starting point. With
regard to the list vote for Dutch voters, we cannot be sure what voters
have in mind. In the conclusion, we reflect on this aspect of our experiment
design. This could, however, be problematic when we compare the results
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between Belgium and the Netherlands. Therefore, we should be careful when
we say something about differences between results in both countries.
In order to test our expectations, we run two logistic regressions for each
country with respectively voting for the list puller and voting for other candi-
dates as dependent variables. Our independent variables are the two treat-
ments: the option to cast a list vote and the option to cast multiple
preference votes. Moreover, we control for a number of factors that the litera-
ture has identified as key predictors for preference voting: political interest,
education and being a party member (André, Wauters, and Pilet 2012). We
also expect that the type of (preference) vote may be a result of the evaluation
of the list puller. We therefore control for this evaluation, by asking voters on a
10-point scale the sympathy for the party they voted for, and the sympathy for
its leader. We include two dummy variables: one for lower list puller evalu-
ations than party evaluations and another for higher list puller evaluations
than party evaluations. Thus, the reference category here is voters who eval-
uated the party and its list puller at the same level.
Results
Respondents were randomly assigned to one of the experimental groups (see
online Appendix E for the distribution and party choice of respondents per
group). Before we start comparing between our experimental groups, we
should note that when we look at the control groups of respondents who
keep the same system as they are used to, these respondents vote very
much in line with the actual electoral results. In group 2 (list vote or multiple
preference vote), which represents the Belgian electoral system, we notice
that 35% of the Belgian respondents cast a list vote (see Figure 1). This is
more or less consistent with actual election results which normally fluctuate
around 40%. In group 3 (single preference vote), 33% of the Dutch respon-
dents cast a vote for another candidate than the list puller (see Figure 2);
this is also more or less in line with the real outcome, although slightly
higher than in real elections. This could be a result of the way we designed
the candidate lists. Familiar candidates tend to be overrepresented on our
candidate lists and even more concentrated at the top of the list. Thus, it is
not surprising that more voters cast a vote for another candidate than we
observe in real-life elections.
The first thing we notice when comparing between groups is that voters
respond to new rules. In the Netherlands, approximately 20% of the respon-
dents in groups 1 (list vote or single preference vote) and 2 (list vote or mul-
tiple preference votes) – respondents who in real life do not have this option –
casted a list vote. The same is true for the option to cast multiple preference
votes. In the Netherlands, 15% of the Dutch respondents casted a preference
vote for multiple candidates. Thus, a substantial part of Dutch voters made use
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of the new options, suggesting that the configuration of electoral rules
matters.
However, when we look at howmany voters used these new rules, we have
to conclude that Dutch voters made less use of the option to cast a list vote
and also were more likely to stick to a single preference vote compared to
Belgian voters, where approximately 40% of the respondents casted a list
vote or used the option to cast multiple preference votes. Additionally,
when we look at how many preference votes were cast by the respondents
in groups 2 (list vote or multiple preference votes) and 4 (multiple preference
votes), we find that in Belgium, voters who did cast a preference vote in one of
these two groups, on average, voted for 2.76 candidates. In the Netherlands,
this was 1.3. In the discussion section, we reflect on the differences between
Belgium and the Netherlands.
Having shown that electoral rules influence voting behaviour, we can now
turn to our expectations. We expect that the option to cast a list vote affects
votes for the list puller. When we look at the model in Table 2, we indeed see a
significant negative relationship between the option to cast a list vote and
voting for the list puller. In both Belgium and the Netherlands, the list
puller received fewer votes if respondents could cast a list vote, compared
to the situation in which respondents could not. The option to cast a list
vote indeed has a negative effect on voting for the list puller.
We further expect that the option to cast a list vote has no influence on
voting for other candidates. If correct, we would expect a non-significant
Table 2. Voting for the list puller.
Belgium The Netherlands
Odds ratio 95% CI Odds ratio 95% CI
List vote 0.306 0.218–0.430 0.630* 0.434–0.914
Multiple pref. votes 1.443* 1.034–2.014 1.122 0.773–1.629
Political interesta
Somewhat interested 1.276 0.876–1.860 0.955 0.600–1.519
Highly interested 1.361 0.802–2.308 1.809 0.871–3.760
Party member 1.332 0.810–2.190 0.792 0.386–1.624
Evaluation differenceb
List puller < party 0.193** 0.121–0.308 0.358** 0.225–0.569
List puller > party 2.204** 1.505–3.229 1.542 0.980–2.428
Educationc
Middle 1.008 0.660–1.541 0.746 0.460–1.211
High 0.798 0.506–1.258 0.322** 0.198–0.525
(constant) 1.606 3.386**
N 713 530
χ2 154.001 (DF = 9. sig. < .01) 64.175 (DF = 9. sig. < .01)
Nagelkerke R2 0.259 0.154
*p < .05, **p < .01.
aReference category: not interested.
bReference category: evaluation list puller = evaluation party.
cReference category: low.
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odds ratio for the list vote. However, in Table 3, we see that respondents who
have the option to cast a list vote are less likely to vote for other candidates in
both Belgium and the Netherlands. The odds ratios for list vote in this model
are actually very close to the list vote odds ratios in the model for list pullers. In
other words, the option to cast a list vote equally affects votes for the list
puller as well as other candidates. These results refute the idea that votes
for other candidates are more sophisticated and more “preferential” in
nature than votes for the list puller in situations where a list vote is not poss-
ible. In our experimental study, we see that the list puller and other candidates
are equally affected by the introduction (or abolition) of a list vote.
The second set of expectations state that the option to cast multiple pre-
ference votes will mostly benefit candidates lower on the list and have no
effect on voting for list pullers. For Belgium, in the model for voting for
other candidates (Table 3), the odds ratio is highly significant. Respondents
who have the option to cast multiple preference votes are four times more
likely to (also) vote for another candidate than voters who do not have that
option. However, opposed to what we expected, the option to have multiple
preference votes also positively affects voting for the list puller (see Table 2).
However, the effect for the list puller is much smaller than the effect for other
candidates, so, in general, our expectation that lower placed candidates
benefit more from multiple preference votes is supported. In the Netherlands,
given the lower use of the option to cast multiple preference votes, it is more
difficult to grasp the effect of this option. Based on the results of the
Table 3. Voting for other candidates.
Belgium The Netherlands
Odds ratio 95% CI Odds ratio 95% CI
List vote 0.325** 0.232–0.455 0.582** 0.401–0.845
Multiple pref. votes 4.001** 2.852–5.614 1.400 0.962–2.037
Political interesta
Somewhat interested 1.436 0.981–2.103 1.355 0.846–2.169
Highly interested 1.659 0.978–2.814 1.035 0.497–2.158
Party member 1.397 0.857–2.277 1.399 0.691–2.833
Evaluation differenceb
List puller < party 2.009** 1.312–3.076 2.434** 1.542–3.843
List puller > party 0.659* 0.448–0.968 0.745 0.473–1.174
Educationc
Middle 0.958 0.624–1.470 1.266 0.782–2.050
High 1.089 0.695–1.707 1.932** 1.191–3.132
(constant) 0.462** 0.307**
N 713 530
χ2 143.220 (DF = 9. sig. < .01) 42.648 (DF = 9. sig. < .01)
Nagelkerke R2 0.244 0.106
*p < .05, **p < .01.
aReference category: not interested.
bReference category: evaluation list puller = evaluation party.
cReference category: low.
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experiment, we should conclude that the option to cast multiple preference
votes has no significant effect on voting for the list puller (Table 2).
However, unlike Belgium, we do not find a significant effect on voting for
other candidates in the Dutch case. This difference between Belgium and
the Netherlands remains robust when we combine the cases in one model
with an interaction term between the Netherlands and multiple list votes
(online Appendix F). Thus, the findings with regard to the effect of multiple
preference votes are mixed. In the next section, we will discuss the nature
of these differences.
Discussion
This paper set out with the aim of studying the extent to which electoral rules
influence electoral behaviour with regard to preference voting. In line with a
recent trend, we conducted an experiment in order to answer this question.
We focused both on the act of casting a preference vote and on the distri-
butions of these votes.
The main finding of our experiment is that electoral rules are important
and strongly shape voting behaviour. Belgian voters were already used to
the options of a list vote and multiple preference votes. Consequently, in
the experimental groups where these options were available, they also
used them. For Dutch voters, these options were new. Nevertheless, about
20% of the Dutch respondents did make use of this option when it
became available to them, and the same can be said for multiple preference
votes. A second important finding of this study is that our results show that –
in the first place for the Netherlands – the idea behind the distinction
between a vote for the list puller as a party vote and a vote for another can-
didate as a preference vote may be too strict. We expected that in systems
where a list vote is not possible, many voters cast a vote for the first candi-
date because this is the most “simple” option when one lacks information
about the candidates. Thus, once an even simpler option is available in
the form of a list vote, we expected voters to go for the list vote instead.
For voters who cast a vote for another candidate, we expected no change
as this is considered to be a more sophisticated type of voting behaviour
(Marsh 1985), reflecting a “real” preference. Yet, this expectation did not
hold. Both the list pullers and other candidates equally lose votes once
the option to cast a list vote becomes available. Why voters who cast a
more sophisticated type of vote in one situation switch to a “simpler” type
of vote in another situation is puzzling and raises the question whether a
“preference vote” for a list puller and a preference vote for another candi-
date are as different from each other as is often assumed, especially in the
Netherlands. Finally, we found that the option to cast multiple preference
186 M. A. M. NAGTZAAM AND P. F. A. VAN ERKEL
votes mostly benefits lower ranked candidates, but this only holds in
Belgium.
Although we argued that it is difficult to compare the results of the
experiment in Belgium and the Netherlands, it is still interesting to look
at the differences. It is not possible to draw strong conclusion from these
differences, but it could help to gain insight in where there is room for
further research. We find that our expectations that other candidates
benefit from the option of multiple preference votes and candidates on
top of the list do not, only receive support in Belgium. Additionally, while
a substantial number of Dutch respondents use the option to cast a list
vote or multiple preference votes, this percentage is by no means as
high as the number of Belgian respondents using these options. We can
only speculate about the nature of these differences. Perhaps a reason is
that the Netherlands has on average stronger leaders, due to the single
national district, giving less incentive to voters to cast a list vote or to
vote for candidates with a lower ballot list position. Yet, this is unlikely as
in the experiment we made the Belgian lists as strong as the Dutch lists
by putting on party leaders. Also the fact that the number of list votes is
still higher for voters of the N-VA, which has a strong leader in Bart De
Wever, goes against this explanation. A more likely explanation is that
differences can be accounted for by voting habits. Belgian respondents
were already familiar with the options to cast a list vote or multiple prefer-
ence votes. For Dutch voters, on the other hand, these rules were new, and
consequently, respondents may have stuck to their usual behaviour. This
could indicate that changes in the electoral system do not immediately
result in changes of voting behaviour, but that voters need some time to
“learn” using the new rules. This is in line with actual election results in
Belgium. The option to cast multiple preference votes was introduced in
1995, but the option was hardy used in the elections of 1995 and 1999.
In 2003 and 2007, however, the average number of votes per “preference
ballot”7 increased (Wauters and Weekers 2008). In 2010, this number
again increased although it dropped slightly in 2014. In general, an increas-
ing use of multiple preference votes was visible. Further research, for
example by studying first time voters, should shed more light on
whether voting habits indeed can account for the differences. However,
if this is the case, it means that the experimental method that is currently
used to estimate effects of electoral rules may actually underestimate these
effects.
Our findings have two important implications. First, our results suggest
that preference votes might be less preferential (with regard to a specific
candidate) than has often been assumed. For systems without list votes, it
is often argued that whereas votes for list pullers might not really be prefer-
ential, votes for all other candidates are based on conscious decisions and
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therefore truly preferential. However, our findings cast doubt on this
common assumption, since both voters who cast a vote for the list puller
and voters who cast a vote for other candidates go for a list vote when pre-
sented with this possibility. Of course, we cannot fully exclude the possibility
that, for some voters, a list vote still contains a preference for a candidate, as
it could be that they prefer candidates at the top of the list and think that a
list vote will help those candidates to get elected. However, considering the
effect sizes we find, it is unlikely that all voters who casted a list vote instead
of a preferential vote think so strategically. Many voters may not be aware
that by casting a list vote, one technically supports the candidates at top
positions. Especially in the Dutch case, where voters are not used to these
new rules and where in the description we did not explain all the impli-
cations of these rules, many voters might not have been aware of the prac-
ticalities of the list vote. In this case, our findings of voters who switch their
vote might be conservative, indicating that at least for a group of voters who
switch their preference vote might be less preferential than has often been
assumed. What this discussion above all shows is that further research is
necessary to get a better understanding of the meaning of a preference
vote and a better insight into the degree of preference in a so-called prefer-
ence vote.
Second, while we argued that we should be reserved in comparing the
results of the experiment in Belgium and the Netherlands, the fact remains
that we found different results in both countries. We speculated that these
differences might be the result of voting habits. If this is true, it means that
we underestimate the effects. In real life, and at least over time, the results
might even be stronger. This has also implications for other experiments.
Even if an experiment is well designed, the extent of the effect might still
be influenced by contextual factors outside the influence of the researcher.
Therefore, we stress the importance of conducting experiments in different
contexts to strengthen the robustness of the findings.
Notes
1. A distinction can also be made on the basis of the relative weight of preference
votes. However, this is related to what happens with the votes and much less
with the type of vote(s) voters can cast. Only in some urban regions does this
have a small effect (Wauters, Verlet, and Ackaert 2012). Therefore, we will not
consider this distinction.
2. In the context of our experiment, we consider all votes for individual candidates
as preference votes, to distinguish them from list votes.
3. For more information, we refer to the SSI website https://www.surveysampling.
com.
4. The time respondents spent on this page was registered. These data led to two
conclusions: (1) voters who used the option to cast a list vote or to cast multiple
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preference votes on average spent more time on the page with the explanations
of voting rules than voters who did not use any of these options (2) based on a
comparison between Belgium and the Netherlands, there is no reason to expect
that this influenced the experiment. At most, the estimation of the effects we
report is conservative.
5. Candidate lists are available on request.
6. The average number of preference votes for the 2007 federal elections in Belgium
was (in Flanders) 2.63 (Wauters and Weekers 2008, 64), 2.75 in 2010 and 2.55 in
2014 (own calculations), so comparable with the results of our experiment.
7. A term used to distinguish ballots with preference votes from ballots with a list
vote.
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